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DIRECT EVIDENCE OF DISCRIMINATORY
INTENT AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF:
AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
CHARLES A. EDWARDS*
Discussing the burden of proof in employment discrimination cases, the
United States Supreme Court in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston'
stated categorically that "... . the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable
where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination. ' 2 With this
broad statement, a unanimous Supreme Court appeared to resolve an issue
which had been actively litigated in the Courts of Appeal.' Rather than
quelling the conflict surrounding the burden of proof in these discrimination
cases, however, the Courts of Appeal remain at odds.4 It is the thesis of this
article that the Supreme Court's departure from controlling precedent pre-
scribing the allocation of the burden of proof in employment discrimination
cases should be recognized as having reiterated the existing law, that is, that
a prima facie case of discrimination can be made out in many ways.
The facts in Thurston represent a microcosm of the controversy asso-
ciated with the burden of proof in employment discrimination cases. In
Thurston, Thurston, a flight captain for Trans World Airlines (TWA), and
two other TWA flight captains were involuntarily retired upon reaching the
age of 60.1 The three captains filed an action against TWA and their union,6
* Partner Greene, Buckley, DeRieux & Jones, Atlanta Georgia; Member of Georgia and
District of Columbia Bars
1. 105 S.Ct. 613 (1985).
2. Id.; See also infra note 66 and accompanying text (setting out McDonnell Douglas
test).
3. See infra notes 81 and 88 and accompanying text (discussing cases which have involved
disputes surrounding burden of proof in employment discrimination actions).
4. See infra notes 193-234 and accompanying text (setting out dispute among courts of
appeal on issue of burden of proof).
5. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 105 S.Ct. 613 (1985).
6. The age-60 retirement policy was a collectively-bargained requirement. Therefore,
although the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 290 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., does not allow
monetary recovery for age discrimination from a labor organization, the Air Line Pilots
Association, International (ALPA), was retained as a party defendant for injunctive relief. The
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alieging that they had been forced to retire solely because of age. In addition
to accepting TWA's two affirmative defenses based on a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification 7 and a bona fide seniority system," the district court held 9
that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimi-
nation under the Supreme Court's McDonnell Douglas standard,1I . The
District Court for the Southern District of New York reasoned that none of
the discharged flight captains could show the existence of a vacancy in flight
engineers' positions when the flight captains were faced with the choice of
retiring or transferring to flight engineer. " The court asserted that this aspect
of its decision was reached "solely because no job vacancy existed at the
time they applied and were eligible for the job."' 12
In Air Line Pilots Association, Int'l v. Trans World Airlines,"' the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court opinion, observ-
ing that the Supreme Court had cautioned that the McDonnell Douglas
analytical framework was "not necessarily applicable in every respect ot
differing factual circumstances,""' nor was it "an inflexible rule."'" Rather,
the Second Circuit explained that "a plaintiff is not barred by the McDonnell
Douglas method from making out a prima facie case of age discrimination
by alternative means, such as direct proof that an employer discriminates on
suit was joined with an action filed by ALPA against TWA to challenge the company's
continued employment of flight engineers beyond age 60. The propriety of monetary relief
against the union was not reached by the Court. See 459 U.S.; cf. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77 (1981) (union not liable for contribution where collectively-
bargained wage differentials violated Title VII and Equal Pay Act).
7. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1): "It shall not be lawful for any employer, employment
agency, or labor organization to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsections (a),
(b), (c), or (e) of this section where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the particular business. . . ." This exemption, normally
referred to as "BFOQ," parallels similar language in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2): "It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency,
or labor organization to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system ... which is not a
subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter, except that ... no such seniority system...
shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual specified by section 731(a)
of this title because of the age of such individual." Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 20003-2(h).
9. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1221
(S.D.N.Y. 1982).
10. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also infra notes
63-72 and accompanying text (discussing McDonnell Douglas test).
11. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1221,
1228-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
12. Id. at 1229.
13. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 713 F.2d 940 (2d Cir.
1983). Judge Van Graafeiland concurred in part and dissented in part, but there are no
distinctions in the panel judges' positions with respect to the burden of proof.
14. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803 n.13 (1973).
15. See Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575 (1978); Texas Dept. of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 n.6 (1981); International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977).
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the basis of age."'' 6 The court in Air Line Pilots Association went on the
note that:
[Plaintiff's] evidence revealed that TWA grants the downgrading
requests of all pilots with sufficient seniority except those of captains
and first officers who reach age 60. This direct evidence of a
differentiation based solely on age is sufficient to give rise to an
inference of discriminatory motive and establishes, therefore, a prima
facie case of discriminatory treatment. 3
TWA's defenses were not an articulation of legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for the policy.' Instead, TWA relied on the absolute statutory
defenses argued before, and accepted by, the court below: a bona fide
seniority system and a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). These
affirmative defenses, as exceptions to the remedial purposes of the statute,
required satisfaction by the employer of a burden of proof; in fact, the
burden thus assumed is greater than a preponderance-of-the-evidence stand-
ard, requiring "plain and unmistakable" evidence that the challenged em-
ployment practice "meets the 'terms and spirit' of the remedial legislation."'' 9
In Thurston, the Supreme Court's review of the dispute between flight
captain Thurston and TWA focused on TWA's BFOQ defense and the
proper test for the imposition of liquidated damages for "willful" discrimi-
nation. *  Neither the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) nor TWA raised
a burden of proof issue in their petitions for certiorari.2' The parties' failure
to argue the burden of proof issue calls into question the Thurston Court's
holding that the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable when the plaintiff
presents direct evidence of discrimination. The validity of the holding of the
Supreme Court in Thurston is particularly questionable when it is noted that
the Court relied for its "direct evidence" analysis on three cited authorities:
(1) the Second Circuit's opinion, which is less than illuminating with respect
to the burden of proof; (2) International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
16. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 713 F.2d 940, 952 (2d Cir.
1983) (emphasis in original) citing Stanojev v. Ebasco Services, Inc., 643 F.2d 914, 921 (2d Cir.
1981)); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 n.18 (Ist Cir. 1979).
17. 713 F.2d at 952 citing Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1031 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981)); Stanjev v. Ebasco Services, Inc., 643 F.2d 914, 921 (2d Cir. 1981);
Stone v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 33, 37 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
18. "Because we determine that TWA and ALPA have failed to come forward with a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for their disparate treatment of appellants, we need not
consider the third step in the Burdine analysis, whether the defendants' reasons were pretextual."
Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 713 F.2d 940, 955 (2d Cir. 1983).
19. Id. at 954 (quoting A. H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945); and
citing Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa, 697 F.2d 743, 748 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, U.S.-, (1983)).
20. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 105 S.Ct. 613 (1985) (statement of issues
presented).
21. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, No. 83-997, 52 U.S.L.W. 3618 (Dec. 16,
1983); Air line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l. v. Thurston, No. 83-1325, 52 U.S.L.W. 3707 (Feb. 8, 1984).
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States22; (3) and Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart.23
Neither Teamsters nor Manhart applies to a non-systemic, 24 disparate
treatment 25 case. 26 In order to understand what the Court in Thurston
intended by its discussion of the McDonnell Douglas test, it is helpful to
review the employment discrimination burden of proof in historical context.
A. Labor Law and the Burden of Proof
The remedial framework of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196427_
and, ,perforce, of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 2 -is derived
from the federal common law developed under the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended.29 The concept of "discrimination" under that statute,
while necessarily somewhat different from that which applies to employment
discrimination statutes, 30 fits into a common analytical pattern.
22. 431 U.S. 324, 58 n.44 (1977)
In Teamsters, the United States Supreme Court stated: Although the McDonnell
Douglas formula does not require direct proof of discrimination, it does demand that
the alleged discriminatee demonstrate at least that his rejection did not result from
the two most common legitimate reasons on which an employer might rely to reject
an aplicant: an absolute or relative lack of qualifications or the absence of a vacancy
in the jobs sought. Elimination of these reasons for the refusal to hire is sufficient,
absent other explanation, to create an inference that the decision [to reject a minority
applicant] was a discriminatory one.
23. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
20. A pattern-or-practice action brought by the federal government, like a class action
brought by a private plaintiff, typically challenges a discriminatory policy or system rather than
a series of discriminatory acts. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751 (1976).
25. "Disparate impact" cases deal with employment practices which, while neutral on
their face, have discriminatory results vis-a-vis a protected group. See Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (standardized tests, high school education requirements). The distinc-
tion between "disparate treatment" and "disparate impact" is discussed in International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. United States. 431 U.S. 324 (1977); see B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW, Ch. 36, p. 1286 (2d ed. 1983).
26. In the Thurston context, citation of Teamsters and Manhart is appropriate; in
Teamsters, the bona fide seniority system defense was the focus of the Court's attention, while
in Manhart the issue revolved around an employer requirement of larger pension fund contri-
butions from women than from men, defended by the employer on economic grounds-that is,
that the cost of providing benefits to female employees justified the higher contribution rate.
27. Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.
(July 2, 1964).
28. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 62 et seq. (December
15, 1967).
29. Act of July 5, 1935, c. 372, 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 el seq. See
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 (1975); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co.,
424 U.S. 747, 768-69 (1976).
30. Two forms of employer "discrimination" are proscribed by the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA): "discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization"
(29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)) and "to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because
he has filed charges or given testimony under this subchapter" (29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4)). See 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (discrimination by labor organization).
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The Supreme Court first dealt with burden of proof issues in National
Labor Relations Board v. Link-Belt Co.' The National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) had ordered Link-Belt to reinstate and pay back pay to a
group of employees who had been found to be victims of discrimination
because of their union membership and activities. 2 The Seventh Circuit
refused to enforce the NLRB's order, finding insufficient evidence of pros-
cribed discriminatory animus.33 In reversing the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, the Supreme Court emphasized that the statute "provides that the
"findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be
conclusive. ' '3 4 The evidence which had been credited by the Board was
admittedly circumstantial;35 nonetheless, the Court stated, "The Board was
justified in relying on circumstantial evidence of discrimination and was not
required to deny relief because there was no direct evidence that the employer
knew these men had joined Amalgamated (the union) and was displeased or
wanted to make an example of them."
36
Link-Belt presents a factual pattern which is remarkably similar to the
typical disparate treatment employment discrimination case. Charged with
anti-union discrimination, the company "claim[ed] that [the employees] were
discharged for unsatisfactory work after time studies had shown their inef-
ficiency and after the day foreman, McKinney, had warned them that their
work was not satisfactory. '3 7 The employees, on the other hand, "denied
that anyone had given them any such warning or had criticized their work,"
resulting in the Board's conclusion "that they were discharged because they
joined [the union]." 38a In short, the Court deferred to the Board's resolution
of credibility issues.
There was not any carte blanche judicial deference to Board findings,
however. Due to the requirement that findings of the Board have "substantial
support in the evidence," ' 39 there was a perceptible tendency on the part of
some reviewing courts to reject Board findings where there was no direct
evidence of discrimination and the circumstantial evidence was less than
compelling." ' Even so, the test which evolved was that stated by the Fourth
31. 311 U.S. 584 (1941).
32. See Link Belt Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 854 (1939).
33. See Link-Belt Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 110 F.2d 506 (7th Cir. 1940).
34. See National Labor Relations Board v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 597 (quoting, 29
U.S.C. § 160(e), 49 Stat. 449).
35. Id. at 588. The Court in Link-Belt stated: "It would indeed be a rare case where the
finders of fact could probe the precise factors of motivation which underlay each employee's
choice." Id. at 597.
36. Id. at 602.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e), (f).
40. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Board v. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp.,
109 F.2d 128, 130 (4th Cir. 1940); National Labor Relations Board v. Goshen Rubber & Mfg.
Co., 110 F.2d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 1940); Indianapolis Power & Light Co v. National Labor
Relations Board, 122 F.2d 747, 761-63 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 804 (1942)
(grudging acceptance of Board's findings as to some, but not all, discriminatees).
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Circuit in National Labor Relations Board v. Entwhistle Manufacturing Com-
pany:
41'
Circumstantial evidence must, of course, be weighed with caution.
Yet, when the strands of such evidence are of sufficient quantity
and proper quality, these strands, as in the instant case, make up a
rope that is strong enough in probative force to constitute at least
substantial evidence that will justify the Board's findings. In that
connection, respondent stoutly maintains that the evidence must
show that Rainwater's Union activities were the motivating reason
that brought about his discharge, and that respondent need not prove
why the discharge took place. True enough, respondent could have
dismissed Rainwater for silly and inconsequential reasons, such as
the color of his hair or the wearing of celluloid collars, and this
would not have been an unfair labor practice. But, when there is
substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial, to indicate that an
employee was discharged because of his Union activities, a very
definite burden is imposed upon the employer to prove the existence
of a reason, not within the prohibitions of the Act, sufficient in
itself to warrant or justify the discharge. And, certainly, when the
employer fails in his undertaking to prove such a reason, the
employer is not thereby in a favorable position to question the
Board's findings of discrimination.
42
The employer in Entwhistle had not offered any reasonable explanation
for the employee's discharge; the only rationale for discharging one of its
1200 employees was "the claimed purpose of giving employment to more
'destitute' inhabitants of [company owned] houses." 43 The Board found that
this explanation was pretextual, and the Fourth Circuit agreed. '
Enactment of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the statute45 in 1947
produced no change in the burden of proof analysis. While deference was
given to Board findings of discrimination, the courts continued to stress
their belief that "mere speculation [was] not sufficient to uphold a finding
of an unfair labor practice. '4 6 The role of direct evidence depended upon its
context; as one court explained, criticizing the Board's rejection of a trial
examiner's credibility resolutions,
Discrimination relates to the state of mind of the employer .... The
General Counsel had the burden of the issue .... [Even though] the
41. 120 F.2d 532 (4th Cir. 1941).
42. Id. at 536.
43. Id.
44. See National Labor Relations Board v. Abbott Worsted Mills, Inc., 127 F.2d 438,
440 (Ist Cir. 1942) (employer's denial of discriminatory motive "utterly unworthy of belief").
45. See Act of June 23, 1947, c. 120, 61 Stat. 136.
46. National Labor Relations Board v. Thomas Rigging Co., 211 F.2d 153, 158 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 871 (1954).
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General Counsel did not carry the burden and introduce substantial
evidence ... the employer did introduce substantial and convincing
evidence that the discharges were for valid 'cause and were not
discriminatory. The only direct evidence upon the point is that of
.. the.., supervisors who made the decisions for respondent....
There was no controverting testimony .... The sole question upon
which the Board could base a ruling that the discharges were
discriminatory was that they did not believe ... the ... witnesses
of respondent who testified to the reasons for the discharges. 47
The Fifth Circuit in National Labor Relations Board v. West Point
Manufacturing Co. 48 stated that, "we must keep in mind that ... proof
that a discriminatory purpose was the motivating one is rarely direct, and it
may therefore be established from all the circumstances. '49 The second half
of the Court's statement was, however, less likely to be quoted in later
opinions: ". . . the burden is throughout upon the Board to establish that
[a discriminatory purpose] was [the motivating one], and this may not lightly
be inferred." 50
Direct evidence of a discriminatory motive was weighed in the totality
of the record, not as a burden-shifting device.5' Indeed, the Fifth Circuit
stated,
It is not and never has been the law that the board may recover
upon failure of the respondent to make proof. The burden is on the
board throughout to prove its allegations, and this burden never
shifts. It is, of course, true that if the board offers sufficient evidence
47. National Labor Relations Board v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 217 F.2d 366,
368-69 (9th Cir. 1954).
48. 245 F.2d 783 (5th Cir., 1957).
49. National Labor Relations Board v. West Point Mfg. Co., 245 F.2d 783, 786 (5th Cir.
1957); see Northern Virginia Steel Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 300 F.2d 168, 174
(4th Cir. 1962) ("this is one of those rare instances in which direct evidence, credited by the
examiner, was offered to establish the true motive for discharging an employee"). The Court
elaborated upon the definition of "substantial evidence" in its often-cited opinion in Universal
Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
50. National Labor Relations Board v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 217 F.2d 366,
368-69 (9th Cir. 1954).
51. e.g., National Labor Relations Board v. Jones Sausage Co., 257 F.2d 878, 881-82
(4th Cir. 1958); National Labor Relations Board v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 274 F.2d 381, 384
(5th Cir. 1960); Northern Virginia Steel Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 300 F.2d
168, 174 (4th Cir. 1962); National Labor Relations Board v. Overnite Transportation Co., 308
F.2d 279 (4th Cir. 1962); National Labor Relations Board v. Melrose Processing Co., 351 F.2d
693, 698-99 (8th Cir. 1965); Local 57, International Ladies' Garment Wkrs. Union v. National
Labor Relations Board, 374 F.2d 295, 298 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 942 (1967);
Behrendt v. National Labor Relations Board, 82 LRRM 2620, 2621, 70 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
13,338 (7TH CIR. 1972) (when there is no direct evidence of discriminatory motivation in record,
board must examine entire record, before it can determine if there is evidence to support
inference of such motivation"); see also Dantzler v. Dictograph Products, Inc., 309 F.2d 326
(4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 970 (1963) (Clayton Act).
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to support a finding against it, a respondent, as stated in the
quotation first above, stands in danger of having such a finding
made unless he refutes the evidence which supports it. But it is
wholly incorrect to say or suggest that the burden of showing
compliance with the act ever shifts to the respondent. The burden
of showing no compliance is always on the board. Even in cases of
actual discharges, cases in short in which the respondent has taken
affirmative action against an employee, this is true, as this court has
many times held.92
B. Employment Discrimination and Other "Civil Rights" Cases: 1965-
1981
Discrimination in the civil rights context has been treated in a different
manner. This evolution was gradual; faced with a claim of racially discrim-
inatory non-renewal of teaching contracts, the Eighth Circuit agreed with
the trial court that the plaintiffs were less qualified than the white teachers
whose contracts were renewed after a consolidation of school districts, 3 since
there was "no direct evidence of any race prejudice or discrimination on the
part of any Board member or official.5 4 The only thing bordering on direct
evidence," said the court, was controverted testimony from black teachers
concerning two alleged statements by supervisory personnel; even if these
statements were made, the court found, "it is doubtful whether these isolated
statements are substantial evidence of discrimination.
' -5 -
The drift toward requiring the defendant to carry the burden of proof
in "constitutional" civil rights cases is addressed by Professor Belton in
Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory
of Procedural Justice.-16 As Professor Belton points out, lower courts had
assumed that the constitutional case was essentially identical to the first
Supreme Court Title VII burden-of-proof decision, Griggs v. Duke Power
Company,-7 "[t]he Supreme Court, however, reversed this trend in Washing-
52. National Labor Relations Board v. Winter Garden Citrus Products Co-operative, 260
F.2d 913, 916 (5th Cir. 1958), criticizing National Labor Relations Board v. Shedd-Brown Mfg.
Co., 213 F.2d 163, 175 (7th Cir. 1954).
53. Brooks v. School Dist. of City of Moberly, 267 F.2d 733 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 894 (1959).
54. Id. at 737.
55. Id. The alleged statements were, "the time would come when teachers would be
employed on the basis of qualifications only" and "no colored teachers would be employed in
Moberly for at least five years." The Court pointed out that the Board, not the supervisors
who were claimed to have made the statements, "was the body that did the hiring." Id.
56. 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1233-35, 1247-50 (1981).
57. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. set out the "disparate
impact" burden of proof formula: once the plaintiff has established that an employment policy,
practice, or system has an adverse and disproportionate impact upon a protected class of
employees or applicants, the defendant may escape liability only through a showing of "business
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ton v. Davis58 when it made it clear that the Griggs statutory disparate
impact test is not applicable to constitutional claims." 59
During the five years between Griggs and Washington-and, indeed,
since the effective date of Title VII in 196560-there had been confusion
regarding the elements of proof of discrimination under that statute and its
later-enacted counterpart, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. 61
Griggs provided one set of standards,62 but the Supreme Court's opinion two
years later in McDonnell Douglas v. Green63 enunciated a completely different
test: while a case of disparate impact under Griggs does not entail proof of
discriminatory intent, a "disparate treatment" case requires a finding of
specific intent to discriminate.
In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court first gave a deferential nod
to Griggs, noting that Griggs dealt with "the removal of artificial, arbitrary,
and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously
to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification. "
64
However, the Court stressed that the Griggs situation was not presented in
McDonnell Douglas; instead, "[t]he critical issue before us concerns the
order and allocation of proof in a private, non-class action challenging
employment discrimination. '65 The Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas
stated that,
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden
under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrim-
ination. This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial
minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which
the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifica-
tions he was rejected and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from
persons of complainant's qualifications.
66
As a cautionary note, the Court observed, "the facts necessarily will vary in
Title VII cases, and the specification above of the prima facie proof required
from a complainant in this case is not necessarily applicable in every respect
to differing factual situations." 6 7 The McDonnell Douglas Court went on to
necessity" or proof of a statutory defense. Under Griggs, this process entails the assumption
and satisfaction of a burden of proof by the defendant.
58. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
59. Belton, supra n.51, at 1233.
60. The date was July 2, 1965. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 716(a), (b), 78 Stat. 266, cited
in Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 758 n.10 (1976).
61. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.
62.
63. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
64. Id. at 801 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971)).
65. Id. at 800 (emphasis supplied).
66. Id. at 802 (emphasis supplied).
67. Id. at 802, n.13.
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explain that once this initial burden has been satisfied, "[tihe burden must
then shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for respondent's rejection ... [that isJ a reasonable basis for a
refusal to hire. "6 The Court referred to this articulation as a "burden of
proof, '69 but stressed that the employer's explanation should not be rejected
solely because it involved "subjective" criteria.70
When the employer has "[made] the prima facie case" in that manner,
the plaintiff "must ... be afforded fair opportunity to show that petitioner's
stated reason for respondent's rejection was in fact pretextual." ' 7' "In short
.. [plaintiff] must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by
competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection
were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision." 7 2
It soon became evident that the Supreme Court had not provided
sufficient guidance for courts or counsel. The burden of proof issue was
raised repeatedly, with mixed results. One line of decisions built upon
McDonnell Douglas (Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,7" Board of
Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 74 and Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine75 refined the disparate-treatment burden-of-
proof model. In Furnco, the Supreme Court asserted that "the burden which
shifts to the employer is merely that of proving that [the employer] based
his employment decision on a legitimate consideration, and not an illegitimate
one such as race." ' 76 The Court went on to use the word "prove" or "proof"
three more times, 77 thereby echoing the unfortunate "burden -of proof"
phrase from McDonnell Douglas."I
The Supreme Court in Sweeney the necessity for defendant's "proof"
by explaining that the employer did not have to prove the absence of a
nondiscriminatory motive, 79 holding that the "burden" has been satisfied
"if [the employer] simply 'explains what he has done' or 'produc[es] evidence
of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons."' 10
Nonetheless, the confusion surrounding the burden of proof in employ-
ment discrimination cases remained, particularly in the Fifth Circuit. While
68. Id. at 802-03 (emphasis supplied).
69. Id. at 803.
70. Id. at 803.
71. Id. at 804.
72. Id. at 805.
73. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
74. 439 U.S. 24 (1978).
75. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
76. See Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
77. Id. at 577-78: "To prove that, he need not prove that he pursued the course which
would both enable him to achieve his own business goals and allow him to consider the most
employment applications." (Emphasis in original). "This is not to say of course that proof of
a justification which is reasonably related to some legitimate goal ends the inquiry."
78. See supra, n.69 and accompanying text (discussing McDonnell Douglas).
79. See Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978).
80. Id. at 25, n.2.
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acknowledging the McDonnell Douglas/Furnco/Sweeney analysis, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit continued to subject employers'
explanations for discharging employees to a rigorous second-guessing.,' The
end product of the Fifth Circuit line of decisions was Burdine. 2
Burdine demonstrates a somewhat impatient explanation to the Fifth
Circuit that its idea about "the burden of proof borne by the defendant
conflicts with interpretations of our precedents by other Courts of Ap-
peals.""' Stressing that the burden of persuasion "never shifts, '" '84 the Court
in Burdine stated:
Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption
that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. If
the trier of fact believes the plaintiff's evidence, and if the employer
81. Some of these decisions were expressly overturned by the Supreme Court, including
Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1977) (expressly disapproved in
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256); East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1975) (criticized in
Burdine 450 U.S. at 256); General Telephone Co. v. Falcon, 450 U.S. 1036 (1981), vacated,
626 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1980); Uncle Ben's Inc. v. Johnson, 451 U.S. 902 (1981), vacated, 628
F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Vaughn, 450 U.S. 972 (1981),
vacated, 620 F.2d 655 (8th Cir. 1980). Certiorari was denied in others. See, e.g., Scott v. City
of Anniston, 597 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980); James v. Stockham
Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); Tanner
v. McCall, 625 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 907 (1981); Williams v.
Tallahassee Motors, Inc., 607 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1979), reh'g denied, 614 F.2d 294, cert. denied,
449 U.S. 848 (1980); Fisher v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 613 F.2d 527 (5th Cir.), reh'g
denied, 618 F.2d 1389 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1115 (1981); Hamilton v. General Motors
Corp., 606 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1979), reh'g denied, 622 F.2d 882, cert. denied, 447 U.S. 907
(1980). But a large residuum of unreviewed Fifth Circuit case law was left with all its foundations
removed but facially intact. It is this body of precedent which continues to haunt the Fifth
Circuit and, even more so, its successor, the Eleventh Circuit. The following list of burden-of-
proof decisions is illustrative, but by no means exhaustive: Corley v. Jackson County Police
Dept., 566 F.2d 997, 999 (5th Cir. 1978) (relying on Turner); Williams v. DeKalb County, 577
F.2d 248, 253 (5th Cir.) (relying on East), vac. on reh'g on other grounds, 582 F.2d 2 (1978);
Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 600 F.2d 470, 473 (5th Cir. 1979), reh'g
granted, reaff'd, 616 F.2d 893 (1980) (relying on Hereford v. Huntsville Bd. of Educ., 574 F.2d
268 (5th Cir. 1978), and Roper v. Effingham County Bd. of Educ., 528 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir.
1976)); Gay v. Board of Trustees of San Jacinto College, 608 F.2d 127, 128 (5th Cir. 1979)
(relying on Scott v. City of Anniston, supra); Crawford v. Western Elec. Co., 614 F.2d 1300,
1319-20 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 620 F.2d 300 (1980) (relying on Turner); Ramirez v. Sloss, 615
F.2d 163, 169 (5th Cir. 1980) (relying on Burdine, 608 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1979)), Turner, and
East); Whiting v. Jackson St. Univ., 616 F.2d 116, 121 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 622 F.2d 1043
(1980) (relying on Burdine). Some of the cited decisions also involved class claims, and others
resulted in judgments for the defendants; notwithstanding those distinctions, each one misstates
the individual-disparate-treatment burden of proof.
82. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
83. Id. at 252,citing, Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1980); Jackson v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 624 F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1980); Ambush v. Montgomery County Govt., 620 F.2d
1048 (4th Cir. 1980); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979)). The lone "but see"
was Vaughn v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 620 F.2d 655 (8th Cir. 1980), vacated, 450 U.S. 972
(1981).
84. 450 U.S. at 253 (quoting 9 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2489 (3d ed. 1940)).
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is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment
for the plaintiff because no issue of act remains in the case." -
According to the Supreme Court in Burdine the burden on the defendant
once the prima facie case has been established is one of production, not of
proof; 6 "the defendant bears only the burden of explaining clearly the
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.
' ' s
1
If the McDonnell Douglas to Burdine standards were the only Supreme
Court pronouncements other than those in Griggs, on the issue of the burden
of proof in employment discrimination cases, the number of analyses of the
propriety of those standards would no doubt be far smaller than it is.', The
85. Id. at 254.
86. Id. at 254-56, 258.
87. Id. at 260.
88. In addition to the Griggs and McDonnell Douglas analyses discussed in this article,
and the pattern-or-practice/class action model set out in Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324 (1977) and Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) the Court has
presented a variety of other burden-of-proof criteria. These include but are not limited to the
following: (1) Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 771-73 (1976) (individual class
members have a very limited burden; to avoid liability to individuals once discrimination against
the class is proved, the employee must "prove that individuals who reapply were not in fact
victims of previous hiring discrimination." The Court cited McDonnell Douglas in this regard);
(2) McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976) (after recounting
the Green test, the Court then cited Moody, infra, for the proposition that "Itfhe use of the
term 'pretext' ... does not mean, of course, that the Title VII plaintiff must show that he
would have been rejected or discharged solely on the basis of his race, without regard to the
alleged deficiencies, ... no more is required to be shown than the race was a "but for"
cause."); (3) Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 621, 627 (1982) (while a determination of
discriminatory intent is "a requisite to a finding of unconstitutional vote dilution, such a finding
is described as "the ultimate issue" rather than as a consideration at the prima facie case stage).
Griggs was followed in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (employment
tests), Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (minimum height and weight requirements),
New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (methadone maintenance program),
Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (statistical proof of discrimination in grand jury
selection) and Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (test with disparate impact may be
challenged even though "bottom line" of selection process does not produce discriminatory
statistical pattern). Other examples of the Teamsters model include California brewers Ass'n v.
Bryant, 444 U.S. 598 (1980), American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 (1982), and
General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982). See also Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635
(1980) ("good faith" related to public official's qualified immunity from suit, is affirmative
defense to employment discrimination action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which defendant must
plead and prove, rather than requiring plaintiff to plead and prove bad faith).
Law review commentary on burden-of-proof issues has been quite extensive. See, e.g.,
Belton, supra n.56; Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the
Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972); Chamallas, Evolving
Conceptions of Equality under Title VII: Disparate Impact Theory and the Demise of the
Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L. REV. 305 (1983); Player, Title VII Impact Analysis Applied
to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Is a Transplant Appropriate? 14 U. TOLEDO L.
REV. 1261 (1983); Helfand & Pemberton, The Continuing Vitality of Title VII Disparate Impact
Analysis, 36 MERCER L. REV. 939 (1985); Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment
Discrimination Law: Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HARv. L. REV. 387 (1975); Note,
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Court has been roundly criticized as inconsistent and as insensitive to
legislative and social policy. 9 That debate is beyond the scope of this article.
Instead, the following discussion will demonstrate how-and why-some
courts have strayed from the path once again.
C. "Direct Evidence-' and the Burden of Proof
Before proceeding to the judicial point of departure from Burdine, it is
necessary to consider the concept of "direct evidence" itself. As one court
has explained:
Circumstantial evidence is that which establishes the fact to be
proved only through inference based on human experience that a
certain circumstance is usually present when another certain circum-
stance or set of circumstances is present. Direct evidence establishes
the fact to be proved without the necessity for such inference. 9°
With direct evidence, the only inference needed is the assumption that the
witness (or document) is credible. Direct evidence is always relevant; circum-
stantial evidence must be weighed for its relevance. 9'
Discriminatory Purposes and Discriminatory Impact: An Assessment AfterFeeney, 79 COLUM.
L. REV. 1376 (1979); Bodin, The Standard of Causation in Mixed Motive Title VII Actions: A
Social Policy Perspective, 82 CoLum L. REV. 292 (1982); Note, Discriminatory Purpose and
Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent, 93 YALE L.J. III (1983); Note, Quasi-
Suspect Classes and Proof of Discriminatory Intent: A New Model, 90 YALE L.J. 912 (1981);
Note, Section 1981: Discriminatory Purpose or Disproportionate Impact? 80 COLUM. L. REV.
137 (1980); Friedman, The Burger Court and the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimi-
nation Litigation: A Critique, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1979); Player, Defining 'Legitimacy' in
Disparate Treatment Cases: Motivational Inferences as a Talisman for Analysis, 36 MERCER L.
REV. 855 (1985); Player, Proof of Disparate Treatment Under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act: Variations on a Title VII Theme, 17 GA. L. REV. 621 (1983); Player, The
Evidentiary Nature of Defendant's Burden in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 49 No. L.
REV. 17 (1984); Smith, Employment Defenses in Employment Discrimination Litigation: A
Reassessment of Burdens of Proof and Substantive Standards, 55 TEMPLE L. Q. 372 (1982);
Furnish, A Path Through the Maze: Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment Under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 After Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C. L. REV. 1129 (1980);
Terrell, Employment Discrimination: The Defendant's Burden, 29 LOYOLA L. REV. 287 (1983);
Witherington, Standards of Proof in Employment Law, 57 CONN. B. J. 239 (1983); Smalls,
Burden of Proof in Title VII Cases, 25 HOWARD L. J. 247 (1982); Smith, Employer Defenses
in Employment Discrimination Litigation: A Reassessment of the Burdens of Proof and
Substantive Standards Following Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 55
TEMPLE L.Q. 372 (1982); Pannick, The Burden of Proof in Discrimination Cases, 131 NEW L.
J. 895 (1981); Bartholet, Proof of Discriminatory Intent Under Title VII," 70 CAL. L. REV.
1201 (1982).
89. See, e.g., Belton, supra n.56.
90. Radomsky v. United States, 180 F.2d 781, 783 (9th Cir. 1950). Cf. United States v.
Henderson, 693 F.2d 1028, 1031 (l1th Cir. 1982) (direct evidence defined as when witness
testifies to fact being asserted on basis of his or her personal knowledge of fact).
91. See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 185 at 435 (2d ed. 1972); see also 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 25 (using "testimonial" rather than "direct" evidence). "Direct evidence also embraces objects
19861
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
While there is a tendency to assume that testimonial evidence falls into
the "direct" category, 92 the testimony of an interested party concerning
ultimate facts, even if credited, can be "substantial evidence," but is "less
than direct evidence." ' 93 When the focus is upon "direct evidence of discrim-
inatory intent," the courts are in hopeless disagreement over a definition of
the term. For example:
(1) Even though a private school distributed printed cards which stated,
"the policy of the school is one of nonintegration," the Fifth Circuit
concluded that "[d]irect evidence as to the discriminatory nature of the
private schools was unavailable. ' 94
(2) In dictum, the First Circuit opined in an age discrimination case that
direct evidence might be found in a statement such as "I am firing you
solely because I want someone younger," 95 or "in a letter or an admission
from a defendant." 96 Company documents "that might be interpreted as
indicating a preference for younger employees," however, were not found
to be "direct evidence that [plaintiff] in particular was fired because of
age."
97
(3) The Ninth Circuit found that an alleged comment to plaintiff, "I
would suggest you find a well-qualified, younger man, someone I can replace
you with" was direct evidence. 98
(4) The Second Circuit stated, "[d]irect proof might sometimes be
available if, for example, the employer had told the employee that he was
being fired because of his age." 99
(5) Again in dictum, the Fifth Circuit said that evidence of intent to
discriminate might be found in "direct evidence ... e.g., a paper scrap with
the notation, "Lay-off-Too Old.'0
(6) A racially-biased letter of complaint from an airline passenger was
deemed to be "direct evidence which served as the nexus between [plaintiff's]
termination and her race."''
or documents offered in evidence to show their existence, characteristics or contents, or a view
of some scene by the Court." MCCORMICK, at p. 435 n.12.
92. See infra notes 94-108 and accompanying text.
93. See National Labor Relations Board v. Buckhorn Hazard Coal Corp., 472 F.2d 53,
56-57 (6th Cir. 1973).
94. School Board of Broward County v. Department of HEW, 525 F.2d 900, 907 and
n.7 (5th Cir. 1976).
95. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 n.12 (1st Cir. 1979).
96. Id. at 1018.
97. Id.
98. See Sutton v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 646 F.2d 407, 409 n.12 (9th Cir. 1981).
99. See Stanojev v. Ebasco Services, Inc., 643 F.2d 914, 921 (2d Cir. 1981) citing, Gillin
v. Federal Paper Board Co., 479 F.2d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 1973)); see also Hagelthorn v. Kennecott
Copper Corp., 710 F.2d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 1983).
100. See Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 130 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 943 (1982).
101. See Williams v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 660 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. 1981).
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(7) The Seventh Circuit, in Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Manufacturing
Company,0 2 contrasted the case before it, which it found to be "wholly
circumstantial," with two "direct evidence cases": Robb v. Chemetron
Corporation'03 involving an "expressed management philosophy of reducing
and controlling the age of management-level employees," and Buchholz v.
Symons Manufacturing Company,104 in which there had been testimony
regarding numerous statements with respect to the plaintiff's age.
(8) The Eighth Circuit gave "great weight" to direct evidence of discrim-
inatory intent in a voting rights case, including statements of legislators and
testimony of city aldermen concerning the reasons for enactment of statutes
and ordinances. 105
(9) "[T]estimony that an interviewer told a [female] job applicant that
'he wanted to fill the position with a man' " was treated as direct evidence
by the District of Columbia Circuit."-9
(10) The Fourth Circuit found that "statements of the defendant" can
be direct evidence,'0 7 while a Sixth Circuit judge has defined direct evidence
to include "discriminatory statements or admission. '""'
The Eighth Circuit's approach to the direct evidence question is especially
difficult to assess. In addition to the decisions discussed above,"'9 the court
has held that "direct proof of age discrimination" included the plaintiff's
demotion from a position for which he was qualified, and his replacement
by a younger man."10 The Eighth Circuit also implied that an inference that
the demotion was "to save money" might be direct evidence.,
In Goodwin v. Circuit Court of St. Louis County, '1 2 Eighth Circuit
treated two alleged statements by one of the defendants-a state court
judge-as direct evidence. In Goodwin, the defendent allegedly asserted that:
"This court will never run well so long as there are women in charge," and
"[the judge] had taken [plaintiff] out of the kitchen, taken her apron off,
and put a robe on her.""' Arguments that these statements were made in
jest and that the prejudicial impact of the evidence far outweighed its
probative value were rejected.
Although the foregoing examples are far from unanimous in their
102. 665 F.2d 149, 157-58 (7th Cir. 1981).
103. 17 FEP Cas. 1535, 1541 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
104. 445 F. Supp. 706, 713 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
105. See Perkins v. City of West Helena, 675 F.2d 201, 207, 213-14 (8th Cir.), aff'd mem.,
459 U.S. 801 (1982).
106. DeMedina v. Reinhardt, 686 F.2d 997, 1002 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
107. See Moore v. City of Charlotte, 754 F.2d 1100, 1105 (4th Cir. 1985).
108. See Weems v. Ball Metal & Chem. Div., Inc., 753 F.2d 527, 531 (6th Cir. 1985)
(Jones, J., dissenting).
109. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
110. See Dace v. ACF Industries, Inc., 722 F.2d 374, 377-78 (8th Cir. 1984).
I1l. Id. The court also called this inference "circumstantial" proof. Id.
112. 729 F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 112 (1985).
113. Id. at 546.
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definitions, it appears to be the prevailing view that "direct evidence" is
probative of an ultimate fact; if believed, this "direct evidence" satisfies the
plaintiff's burden of proving that fact." '4 It is also the prevailing view that
direct evidence is entitled to no greater weight than circumstantial evidence;
direct evidence may be used either to prove a fact or to support a legal
conclusion."' The principal reason for reliance upon circumstantial evidence
rather than direct evidence in employment discrimination cases is the virtually
unanimous recognition that direct evidence of discriminatory intent is seldom
available;" 6 as one court put it, "Unless the employer is a latter-day George
Washington, employment discrimination is as difficult to prove as who
chopped down the cherry tree.""' 7 Indeed, in a voting rights case, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals noted that it was unlikely that plaintiffs could ever
uncover direct proof that "[a voting system] was being maintained for the
purpose of discrimination," and found it "likely that no plaintiff could ever
114. While the Fifth Circuit has likened direct evidence to a "smoking gun," Lodge v.
Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358, 1363 n.8 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd sub nom, Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S.
613 (1982), such a colorful characterization is inaccurate. Presence of a smoking gun leads the
viewer to infer that the gun has been fired; it is, therefore, circumstantial rather than direct
evidence of that fact. See Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 637, 640 (1947).
115. "Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor
demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be
available." Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266 (1977). The apparent lack of difference between direct and circumstantial evidence is seen
in, e.g.: Hombre Hombre Enterprises, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 582 F.2d 204,
207 (9th Cir. 1978); Page v. Bolger, 21 FEP Cas. 780,784, 21 EPD 30,500 (4th Cir. 1979);
Smith v. University of North Carolina, 632 F.2d 316, 334-35 (4th Cir. 1980); Mistretta v. Sandia
Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 597 (10th Cir. 1980); Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 672 F.2d 1107, 1116-19 (3d
Cir., cert. denied, 459 U.S. 824 (1982)); Gay v. Waiters' & Dairy Lunchmen's Union, 694 F.2d
531 (9th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. American National Bank, 652 F.2d 1176, 1189 (4th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 923 (1982); DeMedina v. Reinhardt, 686 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
National Labor Relations Board v. Brookwood Furniture, 701 F.2d 452, 464 (5th Cir. 1983);
Dace v. ACF Industries, Inc., 722 F.2d 374, 377-78 (8th Cir. 1983); and Krodel v. Young, 748
F.2d 701, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
116. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
265 (1977) ("such cases are rare"); accord, Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene State
College, 569 F.2d 169, 175 (1st Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); Polynesian
Cultural Center, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 582 F.2d 467, 473 (9th Cir. 1978);
Ramirez v. Sloss, 615 F.2d 163, 168 (5th Cir. 1980); Lynn v. Regents of Univ. of California,
656 F.2d 1337, 1342 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981); Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409, 1424 (4th
Cir. 1983); see also Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d
1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977) ("as overtly bigoted behavior has become more unfashionable,
evidence of intent has become harder to find"); United States v. Dillon Supply Co., 429 F.2d
800, 804 (4th Cir. 1970) ("proof of overt racial discrimination in employment is seldom direct");
Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 582 F.2d 1055, 1064-65 (4th Cir. 1982) ("the brief trial in this case
presented more direct evidence than is usually available for assessing the motives of those
numicipal officers"); Little v. United States, 489 F. Supp. 1012, 1024 (C.D. Ill. 1980), aff'd,
645 F.2d 77 (7th Cir. 1981), quoted with approval in Leonard v. City of Frankfort Elec. &
Water Plant, 752 F.2d 189, 193 (6th Cir. 1985) ("it is the exceptional case where there is clear,
direct evidence of racial animus").
117. Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 638 (5th Cir. 1985).
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find direct evidence that the system was maintained for discriminatory
purposes.""' 8 The Sixth Circuit in Alexander v. Youngstown Board of
Education ",9 expressed a similar sentiment, stating that: "As a practical
matter, intent can only be proven circumstantially." ' 20
D. The Eleventh Circuit Loses Its Way
On October 1, 1981, the Fifth Circuit was split in two: the "new" Fifth
Circuit was comprised of the states of Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas,
while Alabama, Florida and Georgia became the Eleventh Circuit. 2' As its
first order of business, the Eleventh Circuit in Bonner v. City of Prichard
22
adopted "old" Fifth Circuit decisions as binding precedent." ,4 This apparently
ministerial act, however, was to sow the seeds of mischief.
In order to see the problem in perspective, it is best to leapfrog interim
decisions and then retrogress. The "landing point" is the Eleventh Circuit's
opinion rendered two years after Bonner: Bell v. Birmingham Linen Serv-
ice. 24 Bell was a straightforward sex discrimination action brought under
Title VII, in which the plaintiff alleged that her employer "declined to
promote her, or 'constructively demoted' her, because she was a woman." 12"
Following a non-jury trial in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama, judgment was entered for the defendant employer. 126
Reviewing the district court's decision in Bell, the Eleventh Circuit panel
seized upon testimony of both plaintiff and her union steward (also a woman)
that the company's production manager, when asked why plaintiff was not
being awarded a seniority-bid job in the washroom at a higher rate of pay,
"stated ... that he would not put Nora Bell in the washroom because if he
did, 'every woman in the plant would want to go into the washroom.''1
12
1
The trial court had "specifically found that Westbrook (the production
manager) made this statement, or a similar statement in substance, to Bell
and Robinson (the union steward)."'
2
118. Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358, 1363, 1373 (5th Cir. 1981),, aff'd sub nom, Rogers
v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) ("clearly, the right to relief cannot depend on whether or not
public officials have created inculpatory documents") For an interesting discussion of injudicious
comments as being less than conclusive, see Player, Proof of Disparate Treatment Under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Variations on a Title VII Theme, 17 GA. L. REV. 621,
662-663 (1983).
119. 675 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1982).
120. Id. at 791.
121. Pub. L. No. 96-452, § 2, 94 Stat. 1994 (Oct. 14, 1980), 28 U.S.C. § 41.
122. 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981).
123. See id.; see also Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982).
124. 715 F.2d 1552 (1lth Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 2385 (1984).
125. Id. at 1552.
126.
127. Bell v. Birminham Linen Service, 715 F.2d 1552, 1553 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
105 S.Ct. 2385 (1984).
128. Id. at 1553-54.
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An arbitrator found for Bell and awarded her back pay. 29 The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission found reasonable cause to believe
that she had been the victim of sex discrimination. 30 The trial court found
that Bell had made out a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell
Douglas and Burdine.'3' Nonetheless, the court found for the employer on
the merits, stating,
the real issue in this case, notwithstanding any comments made by
Westbrook or the findings of the EEOC or the arbitration decision,
is whether [the company's] deliberate effort to place [a male em-
ployee] in the position was motivated by matters relating to sex or
whether this effort was motivated by [the male's] prior experience
and ability to perform the job without further training.'
3 2
The Eleventh Circuit panel reviewed these findings and the development
of case law concerning the burden of proof in what it conceded to be a
disparate treatment case,' but then announced a departure from the prece-
dents it had cited:
It should be clear that the McDonnell Douglas method of proving
a prima facie case pertains primarily, if not exclusively, to situations
where direct evidence of discrimination is lacking. It would be
illogical, indeed ironic, to hold a Title VII plaintiff presenting direct
evidence of a defendant's intent to discriminate to a more stringent
burden of proof, or to allow a defendant to meet that direct proof
by merely articulating, but not proving, legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reasons for its actions. Following these principles, this court
has held that where a case of discrimination is proved by direct
evidence, it is incorrect to rely on a McDonnell Douglas rebuttal. If
the evidence consists of direct testimony that the defendant acted
with a discriminatory motive, and the trier of fact accepts this
testimony, the ultimate issue of discrimination is proved. Defendant
cannot refute this evidence by mere articulation of other reasons;
the legal standard changes dramatically:
Once an [illegal] motive is proved to have been a significant or
substantial factor in an employment decision, defendant can
rebut only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
the same decision would have been reached even absent the
presence of that factor.
The district court in this case specifically accepted as credible testi-
mony indicating that Birmingham Linen Service's decision-maker,
129.
130. Id. at 1554.
131. Id. at 1555.
132. Id. at 1555.
133. Id. at 1556.
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Gus Westbrook, stated that he would not allow Bell into the wash-
room because if she were allowed in, all women would want to enter.
This testimony is "highly probative evidence" of illegal discrimina-
tion.'34
Concluding its decision to remand the case, the Eleventh Circuit in Bell
asserted that, "Unless the district court concludes that Westbrook's sexual
bias had no relation whatsoever to his employment decision, (Birmingham
Linen Service) must establish by a preponderance of evidence that it would
have made the same decision in the absence of the illegal factor.""'
Contrary to the Eleventh Circuit panel's assertions, however, the result
in Bell and the test it espouses represent a misreading of prior decisions
coupled with a reliance on precedents which are no longer valid, Bonner
notwithstanding. Examination of those precedents clearly demonstrates the
court's errors.
(1) Lee v. Russell County Board of Education:136 Russell County, a long-
running school desegregation case, served as the umbrella under which a
variety of claims of unlawful and unconstitutional discrimination had been
brought. 1 7 When three untenured teachers and their principal were all denied
reemployment, constitutional claims of discrimination were lodged with the
court."3 8 Applying the McDonnell Douglas proof standard, the trial court
"ruled from the bench that plaintiffs had not met their burden of proving
by a preponderance of the evidence that their nonrenewals were unconstitu-
tional."'' 9
The Eleventh Circuit, in an opinion written by Chief Judge Godbold,
vacated the trial court's judgment. 411 Looking at the three steps in the
McDonnell Douglas minuet 4' the court first observed, "[tihe McDonnell
Douglas analysis is only one means of proving a case of discrimination,
134. Id. at 1556-57.
135. Id. at 1558.
136. 684 F.2d 769 (11th Cir. 1982).
137.
138. Id. at 771. One teacher was a black male, one a black female, and one an "[Asiatic]
Indian" female; the principal was a white male.
139. Id. at 772.
140.
141. Characterization of the Mcdonnell Douglas analytical process as a "minuet" appar-
ently originated with Sime v. Trustees of California St. Univ. and Colleges, 526 F.2d 1112,
1114 (9th Cir. 1975). See also Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277, 1281 (7th Cir.
1977); Halsell v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 683 F.2d 285, 291 n.5 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1205 (1983); Cline v. Roadway Express, Inc., 689 F.2d 481, 486 (4th Cir. 1982); Lewis v.
University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 925 (3d Cir. 1984) (Adams, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
105 S.Ct. 266 (1985). There is also a somewhat pejorative use of the expression, first found in
(then-District) Judge Higginbotham's observation that the "value of the Burdine sequence" in
a complex class action "is about as relevant as a minuet is to a thermonuclear battle." Vuyanich
v. Republic National Bank, 521 F. Supp. 656, 661 (N.D. Tex. 1981), vac. on other grounds,
723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoted with approval in Craik v. Minnesota St. Univ. Bd., 731
F.2d 465, 470 n.7 (8th Cir. 1984); and Chang v. University of Rhode Island, 606 F. Supp. 1161,
1185 (D.R.I. 1985)).
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however. It is not the exclusive means."'' 42 Five authorities were cited:
Furnco,143 which followed the McDonnell Douglas pattern but stated that
the test for proof of a prima facie Title VII case "was not intended to be
an inflexible rule;" 1" Teamsters,'4- a pattern-or-practice case in which a
statutory affirmative defense was asserted by the defendants; 146 and three
Fifth Circuit opinions.
147
Lee v. Conecuh County Board of Education,14 the first of the three
Fifth Circuit decisions relied upon by the Eleventh Circuit in Bell, arose out
of a school desegregation order in which the Fifth Circuit imposed a "clear
and convincing evidence" standard on the defendant, 49 relying in turn upon
Lee v. Washington County Board of Education."" There is serious question
regarding the continued viability of the Conecuh County standard after
Burdine.'5 1 In any event, the standard is, at most, only pertinent to a case
"where the defendant has an immediate past history of racial discrimination,
such as a school district operating under a Federal injunction ending a recent
regime of de jure segregation."' 15 2
The second and third Fifth Circuit opinions cited in Lee v. Russell
County Board are McCuen v. Home Insurance Company'5 and McCorstin
v. United States Steel Corporation, 15 4 both of which modified the McDonnell
Douglas standards in the context of age discrimination challenges to employ-
ers' reductions in force. These precedents, therefore, add nothing out of the
ordinary to the analytical picture.
Next, the court in Russell County stated,
[tihe McDonnell Douglas analysis is "[ilntended progressively to
sharpen inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional
discrimination" . . . where the plaintiff's case is made out with
circumstantial evidence supporting the inference of discrimina-
142. See Lee v. Russell County Board of Education, 684 F.2d 769, 773 (1Ith Cir. 1982).
143. Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
144. Id. at 576.
145. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
146. Id. at 357-58.
147. Id.
148. 634 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1981).
149. Id. at 963.
150. 625 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Lee v. Russell County Board of Education,
684 F.2d 769, 774-75 n.7 (lth Cor. 1982).
151. See Hammond v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 590 F. Supp. 988, 994 (W.D. La. 1984),
aff'd mem., 755 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1985); cf. Baylor v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 733
F.2d 1527, 1533 (lth Cir. 1984) (question reserved).
152. Hammond v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 590 F. Supp. 988, 994 (W.D. La. 1984), aff'd
mem., 755 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1985). The Fifth Circuit now sees Lee v. Conecuh County Bd. of
Educ. as a McDonnell Douglas case. See Merwine v. Board of Trustees for State Institutions,
754 F.2d 631, 635 n.3 (5th Cir. 1985) (also citing Burdine). With the summary affirmance of
Hammond, little is left of the Lee/Lee test.
153. 633 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1981).
154. 621 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1980).
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tion.... where a case of discrimination is made out by direct
evidence, reliance on the four-part test developed for circumstantial
evidence is obviously unnecessary.'
Two examples were given: Ramirez v. Sloss' -6 and Crawford v. Western
Electric Company.
157
Ramirez relied in turn upon three decisions which were either expressly
or implicitly overruled by the Supreme Court in Burdine.1 ' Crawford, on
the other hand, simply stated, "Statistical disparity between blacks and
whites, especially when coupled with direct evidence of racially motivated
conduct or language, might also, in a proper case, satisfy plaintiff's initial
burden."1 59
The questionable precedent of Ramirez is, therefore, the only stated
support for the idea that direct evidence, without more, is sufficient to meet
the plaintiff's burden; moreover, the only burden which is involved is that
of establishing a prima facie case'60-hence, reference to the "four-part
test." 61 Nothing else in Ramirez survived Burdine. Even so, this aspect of
the court's decision in Russell County, while novel, is not wholly objection-
able. Assuming a showing of membership in the protected group and an
adverse employment action-neither of which is usually contested-the other
elements of the first McDonnell Douglas step may indeed be supplied by
direct rather than circumstantial evidence. There is general agreement that
direct evidence of a discriminatory motive may suffice to establish a prima
facie case.' 62 This was, in fact, the meaning of the Supreme Court's language
155. Lee v. Russell County Board of Educ., 684 F.2d 769, 773-74 (11 th Cir 1982) (emphasis
in original) (citations omitted).
156. 615 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1980).
157. 614 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1980).
158. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
159. Crawford v. Western Electric Co., 614 F.2d 1300, 1315 (5th Cir. 1980). The Crawford
court noted that in a purely statistical case without evidence of purposeful discrimination, no
prima facie case was found. Id. (citing, 586 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1978)).
160. Ramirez v. Sloss, 615 F.2d 163, 169 (5th Cir. 1980).
161. See Lee v. Russell County Board of Educ., 684 F.2d 769, 774 (11th Cir. 1982).
162. See, e.g., Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 n.12 (1st Cir. 1979) (dictum);
Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1113 (4th Cir. 1981); Stanojev v. Ebasco
Services, Inc., 643 F.2d 914, 921 (2d Cir. 1981) (dictum); Sutton v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 646
F.2d 407, 409, 412 (9th Cir. 1981) (dictum); Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 531 n.2 (9th
Cir. 1981) (dictum); Baldwin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 667 F.2d 55-458, 462 (5th Cir. 1982)
("the appellant failed to discharge his burden of proving, by direct or circumstantial evidence,
a prima facie case of age discrimination"); Bradley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 683 F.2d 86, 88 (4th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1983) (dictum); Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d
1176, 1180 (6th Cir. 1983) (dictum); Pace v. Southern Ry. Syst., 701 F.2d 1383, 1388 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 549 (1983) (dictum); Hagelthorn v. Kennecott Corp., 710 F.2d
76, 80 (2d Cir. 1983); Coburn v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 339, 343 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 488 (1983) (dictum); Rasimas v. Michigan Dept. of Mental
Health, 714 F.2d 614, 623 (6th Cir. 1983), and 714 F.2d at 630 n.6 (Hoffman, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 426 (1984); Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Transworld Airlines, Inc.,
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in Thurston:163 direct evidence may be used to establish a prima facie case.
TheRussell County decision then marched into uncharted territory. Pur-
porting to rely on Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle,'4 a public-
employee freedom-of-speech case, the court stated:
Where a case for discrimination is proved by direct evidence it
is incorrect to rely on a McDonnell Douglas form of rebuttal. Under
the McDonnell Douglas test plaintiff establishes a prima facie case
when the trier of fact believes the four circumstances outlined above
which give rise to an inference of discrimination. Where the evidence
for a prima facie case consists, as it does here, of direct testimony
that defendants acted with a discriminatory motivation, if the trier
of fact believes the prima facie evidence the ultimate issue of
discrimination is proved; no inference is required. Defendant cannot
rebut this type of showing of discrimination simply by articulating
or producing evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. Once
an unconstitutional motive is proved to have been a significant or
substantial factor in an employment decision, defendant can rebut
only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the same
decision would have been reached even absent the presence of that
factor. 16-
This holding is unsupported by the other authority cited,by the court in
Russell County, Avery v. Homewood City Board of Education." Avery
involved the same defendant's burden analysis discussed above, 67 and like-
wise should be limited to discriminatory patterns established as a matter of
issue preclusion.
Mt. Healthy, which antedates Burdine, Furnco, and Sweeney, presents
a procedural framework for analyzing a so-called "mixed-motive"' 6 em-
ployment decision in the public sector. The principles involved are constitu-
tional-"a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as
an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees."'1
69
Discussing the burden of proof in Mt. Healthy, the Supreme Court
stated that,
713 F.2d 940, 952 (2d Cir. 1983), aff'd 465 U.S. 1065 (1985); White v. Vathally, 732 F.2d
1037, 1043 (Ist Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 331 (1985).
163. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
164. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
165. See Lee v. Russell County Board of Educ., 684 F.2d 769, 774 (11th Cir. 1982).
166. 674 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 943 (1983).
167. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text; cf. Professional Ass'n of College
Educators v. El Paso County Community College, 730 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S.Ct. 248 (1985).
168. See supra notes and accompanying text.
169. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283 (1977) (quoting Pickering v.
Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
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Initially, the burden was properly placed upon the [employee]
to show that his conduct was constitutionally protected, and that
this conduct was a "substantial factor"-or to put it in other words,
that it was a "motivating factor" in the Board's decision not to
rehire him. [The employee] having carried that burden, however, the
District Court should have gone on to determine whether the Board
had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have
reached the same decision as to respondent's reemployment even in
the absence of the protected conduct.
°7 0
Although Mt. Healthy may be applicable to constitutional claims involv-
ing free speech, equal protection, or due process, there is no basis for
transposing a burden of proof upon a private employer in a Title VII or
ADEA disparate treatment case, irrespective of the nature or quantum of
the plaintiff's proof. The importation of a Mt. Healthy burden in Russell
County, therefore, was marginally defensible, but its use in Bell is totally
inappropriate. 7
Interestingly, on remand inRussell County the trial court once more
applied McDonnell Douglas standards, rejecting the purported direct evi-
dence;'17 2 On a second appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, apparently
without recognizing this change of emphasis.'
7
(3) Perryman v. Johnson Products Company. 74 References to the role
of direct evidence in Perryman, a sex discrimination action, are not suppor-
tive of the result reached in Bell. The Eleventh Circuit in Perryman cautioned,
"It is important to bear in mind.., that the defendant's burden of rebuttal
[under McDonnell Douglas and Burdine] is exceedingly light."'7 5 The Per-
ryman court explained that "the defendant's burden is 'merely one of
production, not proof."' ' 76 The Eleventh Circuit in Perryman noted that the
record "present[ed] substantial direct and circumstantial evidence of illegal
sexual discrimination,' ' 77 but that the employer had "presented a vigorous
defense which created an issue of fact as to most, if not all, of the allegations
of discrimination" and, in so doing "met its minimal burden of articulating
non-discriminatory reasons for its decisions."'' 76
170. Id. at 287.
171. In fact, Russell County is self-limiting: "Where strong, direct evidence is presented,
reliance on McDonnell Douglas as the exclusive means of proving the case and as the proper
form of rebuttal is incorrect. When a significant unconstitutional motive is ultimately proved
by either circumstantial or direct evidence, the defendants' only form of rebuttal is under Mt.
Healthy. " 684 F.2d at 774 (emphasis supplied). Hence, Mt. Healthy applies upon proof of an
unconstitutional motive, irrespective of whether the proof was direct oi circumstantial
172. See Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 744 F.2d 768, 770 (11th Cir. 1984).
173. Id.
174. 698 F.2d 1138 (11th Cir. 1983).
175. Id. at 1142.
176. Id. quoting Lee v. Russell County Board of Educ., 684 F.2d 769, 773 (11th Cir.
1982)).
177. Id. at 1143.
178. Id. However, the court had clouded this holding by citing Mt. Healthy and stating
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Perryman, as a class action, presented problems which are not pertinent
to a McDonnell Douglas model. 179 But the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
in a burst of misplaced enthusiasm, threw in a bit of advice:
Of course, some plaintiffs are able to prove the existence of
discriminatory intent by direct evidence; in these rare cases, the
plaintiff is not required to rely on the inference of discrimination
created by the prima facie case of McDonnell Douglas .... If the
factfinder believes the direct evidence presented by the plaintiff, a
presumption is created that the adverse employment action taken
against the plaintiff was a product of that discriminatory in-
tent ..... At this point, just as with a successful showing by the
plaintiff of discriminatory intent based on circumstantial evidence,
the burden shifts to the defendant to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the adverse action would have been taken even in
the absence of a discriminatory motive. 1
80
This dictum was a source of the later mischief in Bell, because it
superimposed a constitutional standard of proof, premised on discredited
Fifth Circuit authority, onto a private, statutory case. The trial court which
had to grapple with Perryman on remand'"" simply quoted the varying
burden of proof tests, also citing Bell, 82 restated the findings of fact at
length, and once more found for the plaintiffs. This time, however, the
court found that discriminatory intent had been shown through direct
evidence 83 and that the defendant's response did "not meet the defendant's
heavy burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the adverse
action ... would have been taken even in the absence of gender discrimi-
nation. 84 Every other substantive ruling with respect to both individual and
class claims also was premised on Mt. Healthy even though there was no
direct evidence involved.8 5 This is not surprising, given the Eleventh Circuit's
expressed view that any proof of discriminatory intent placed the "but for"
burden on the employer.
86
that the presumption of discriminatory intent created by the prima facie case "may only be
rebutted by a showing by the employer that the adverse action would have been taken even in
the absence of discriminatory intent." Id. at 1142.
179. See Id. at 1143-44.
180. Id. at 1143.
181. See Perryman v. Johnson Products Co., 580 F. Supp. 1015 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
182. Id. at 1017-18.
183. The only direct evidence mentioned by the court was a statement by a district sales
manager "that the company was looking for men to fill the sales reprsentative position because
the women who had worked for Johnson Products in those positions in the past had been 'a
bunch of rotten eggs.' " Id. at 1021.
184. Id. at 1022.
185. Id. at 1023, 1030, 1034-35 (class claims); id. at 1025, 1027 (promotion claims); id. at




(4) Eastland v. Tennessee Valley Authority.8 7 The final authority cited
in Bell, Eastland was a class action brought by black employees of Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA). The only portion of the Eastland decision mentioned
in Bell was that "testimony of selecting supervisor's racial bias, plus other
evidence, defeated defendant's McDonnell Douglas rebuttal."' 8 But in East-
land, the trial court made a finding that the supervisor was not racially
biased, which the Eleventh Circuit reversed because "four black employees
testified as to [the supervisor's] racially discriminatory behavior."'819 The
reversal was phrased in classic McDonnell Douglas terms: "We need not
decide whether TVA met its burden of articulating legitimate reasons for its
decision because [plaintiff] established that TVA's asserted reasons were
pretexts for discrimination.' '90
The preceding analysis shows that the "new rule" in Rell is neither
supported by precedent nor consistent with the underlying siatptgry frame-
work. It imposes upon a defendant precisely the sort of burden, qriticized in
Sweeney as "the almost impossible burden of proving abseng Pf Oiscrimi-
natory motive"' 9'1 with an even more staggering twist: discrimina'tory motive
has been proved, so that the employer must show that its discrimination
made no difference!
E. Unringing the Bell
The Eleventh Circuit is not solely responsible for the confusion over
direct evidence and its effect. In Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corporation, 92 an
age discrimination case, a Fourth Circuit panel majority stated:
Plaintiff produced direct evidence of the purpose and conduct of
Whirlpool, demonstrating discrimination against him and others
because of his age, that the jury clearly found persuasive. The
reliance on direct evidence instead of inferences obviated any need
for an independent showing that Whirlpool's asserted justifications
were "Pretextual.'
93
187. 704 F.2d 613 (llth Cir.) on reh'g, 714 F.2d 1066 (1983) (the opinion on rehearing
was rendered before, but not referenced in, Bell).
188. See Bell v. Birmingham Linen Service, 715 F.2d 1552, 1552 (lth Cir. 1983), Cert.
denied, 104 S.Ct. 2385 (1984) (citing Eastland v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 704 F.2d 613, 626
(11th Cir. 1983)).
189. See Eastland v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 704 F.2d 613, 626 (11 th Cir. 1983)).
190. Id. Use of direct evidence to show pretext is commonplace. See, e.g., Sweat v. Miller
Brewing Co., 708 F.2d 655, 657 (l1th Cir. 1983) (dictum); Dade v. ACF Industries, Inc., 722
F.2d 374, 377-78 (8th Cir. 1983); Weems v. Ball Metal & Chem. Div., Inc., 753 F.2d 527, 531
(6th Cir. 1985) (Jones, J., dissenting); Jorgensen v. Modern Woodmen of America, 751 F.2d
502, 504 (8th Cir. 1985); Easley v. Empire Inc., 757 F.2d 923 (8th Cir. 1985).
191. See Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978); see
also id. at 29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192. 641 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1981).
193. Id. at 1113. The court never explained what the "direct evidence" was.
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The dissent in Spagnuolo, however, had a different view of the effect of the
production of direct evidence, pointing out that: "While the production of
direct evidence might relieve the plaintiff of the necessity of proving each of
the elements of a McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, it does not justify a
complete departure from the sensible and orderly presentation of evidence
under that case."' 94
The Bell test has established a misconception-little allayed by the
Eleventh Circuit's later decisions-that any biased comment alleged to have
been made by a management representative automatically saddles the em-
ployer with the burden of proof. While there must be a causal nexus between
the biased statement or document and the decision at issue, 95 that rather
obvious tenet has not been adhered to by the Eleventh Circuit.
For example, in Walker v. Ford Motor Company,9 6 the court found
that racial slurs and epithets had created a discriminatory atmosphere, but
the causal link between this "atmosphere" and plaintiff's discharge was
established circumstantially. 197 In Lewis v. Smith, 98 although discarding the
"clear and convincing evidence" test as inappropriate,' 99 testimony that
plaintiff was qualified but that her application was not considered was
treated as conclusively shifting the burden of proof to the employer. Miles
v. M.N.C. Corporation200 reversed a judgment for the defendant because the
trial court struck a racial slur from the record after trial. 20 , Such testimony,
which has been described as a "bloody shirt" 2 2-inflammatory and preju-
dicial, but not particularly probative-should not be encouraged. However,
many plaintiff's counsel, in their quest to take advantage of the Bell test,
have made direct evidence a sine qua non to their case in chief.
Equally disturbing is a trend toward characterizing evidence as "direct"
which is not "direct" at all. The First Circuit in Banerjee v. Board of
Trustees of Smith College,20 addressed this trend and characterized plaintiff's
purported "direct evidence" as consisting "simply of nonprobative evidence
accompanied by speculation. Other items are minor examples of what
194. Id. at 1115. Interestingly, the Eleventh Circuit has said that Spagnuolo means that
direct evidence established a prima facie case-not that the burden is shifted. See Pace v.
Southern Ry. System, 701 F.2d 1383, 1388 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 97 (1983) (dictum).
195. 684 F.2d 1355 (11th Cir. 1982).
196.
197.
198. 731 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1984).
199. Id. at 1539. Butsee Gilchrist v. Bolger, 733 F.2d 1551, 1554 (11th Cir. 1984) ("Without
proof of an immediate past history of discrimination, the rebuttal burden on the defendant is
the preponderance of the evidence, not clear and convincing evidence." There was no direct
evidence in the case).
200. 750 F.2d 867 (11 th Cir. 1985); see also Thompkins v. Morris Brown College, 752 F.2d
558 (11 th Cir. 1985).
201.
202. See Carter v. Duncan-Huggins, Inc., 727 F.2d 1225, 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
203. 648 F.2d 61 (1st Cir. 1981)
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assuredly may have constituted poor judgment, and hence may have circum-




No court of appeals other than the Eleventh Circuit has accepted the
burden-shifting model set up by Bell.20 Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit
has continued to demonstrate a fondness for the Bell test and has com-
pounded the problem because of a tendency to remand any lower court
decision which does not expressly mention the presence and role of direct
evidence in that determination. 2 7 Bell is also cited with approval in opinions
which have no direct evidence at issue.
208
Also moving in another direction to exact greater evidentiary submissions
from the defendant employer, the Eleventh Circuit now deems articulated
reasons which are "subjective" to be illegitimate209-or, at least, sometimes
204. See Banerjee v. Board of Trustees of Smith College, 648 F.2d 61, 66 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981); see also Clay v. Hyatt Regency Hotel, 724 F.2d 721, 724 (8th
Cir. 1984); Carter v. Duncan-Huggins, Inc., 727 F.2d 1225, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Johnson v.
Allyn & Bacon, Inc., 731 F.2d 64, 69 n.6 (Ist Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 433 (1985);
Gilchrist v. Bolger, 733 F.2d 1551, 1554 (11th Cir. 1984); Norcross v. Sneed, 755 F.2d 113,
118-19 (8th Cir. 1985).
205. See, e.g., Clay v. Hyatt Regency Hotel, 724 F.2d 721, 724 (8th Cir. 1984); Curry v.
Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 730 F.2d 598, 602 (10th Cir. 1984); Johnson v. Allyn & Bacon,
Inc., 731 F.2d 64, 69 n.6 (Ist Cir. 1984); Grigg v. W. A. Foote Memorial Hosp., Inc., 741
F.2d 1486, 1494-1505 (6th Cir. 1984); Norcross v. Sneed, 755 F.2d 113, 118-19 (8th Cir. 1985);
Friends v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Mid-America, 759 F.2d 813, 814 (10th Cir. 1985); Easley
v. Empire Inc., 757 F.2d 923 (8th Cir. 1985). But see Wheeler v. City of Columbus, 686 F.2d
1144, 1153 (5th Cir. 1982) (on remand, trial court to deal with allegation that city council
member told plaintiff "that her job of auditorium manager was not one for a woman." On a
second appeal, 703 F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1983), judgment for the defendant was affirmed).
206. "In cases where proof of impact alone is insufficient, where a stark pattern of
discrimination is not evident, the courts should consider circumstantial evidence .... Jean v.
Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1486 (11th Cir. 1983), reh'd on reh'g en banc, 727 F.2d 957, reh'g
denied, 733 F.2d 9089 (1984), vacated, 105 S.Ct. 2992 (1985). And in NAACP v. Badsden County
School Bd., 691 F.2d 978, 981-82 (11th Cir. 1982), the court even made reference to direct
evidence of discriminatory intent which had been presented by an expert witness The testimony,
although apparently credited, was found insufficient to establish such intent. But cf. Dybczak
v. Tuskeegee Institute, 737 F.2d 1524, 1528 (1lth Cir.), reh'g denied, 744 F.2d 97 (1984), cert.
denied, 105 S.Ct. 576 (1985) (direct evidence does not shift burden of proof unless it is "directly
probative of intent").
207. See, e.g., Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 875-76 (1 1th Cir. 1985); Thompkins
v. Morris Brown College, 751 F.2d 558, 563 (11th Cir. 1985); Buckley v. Hospital Corp. of
America, 758 F.2d 1525, 1529-30 (11th Cir. 1985); Hill v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 767 F.2d
771, 775 (11th Cir. 1985).
208. See Fowler v. Blue Bell, Inc., 737 F.2d 1007, 1017 (l1th Cir. 1984) (Hatchett, J.,
dissenting); Carmichael v. Birmingham Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126, 1131 n.1 (11th Cir. 1984);
Smith v. Georgia, 749 F.2d 683, 687 (lth Cir. 1985); Simmons v. Camden County Bd. of
Educ., 757 F.2d 1187, 1189 (lth Cir. 1985); Nord v. U.S. Steel Corp., 748 F.2d 1462, 1467-
68 (lth Cir. 1985); Conner v. Fort Gordon Bus Co., 761 F.2d 1495, 1498-99 n.4 (11th Cir.
1985).
209. See Morrison v. Booth, 763 F.2d 1366 (11th Cir. 1985); Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750
F.2d 867 (11th Cir. 1985); Williams v. City of Montgomery Fire Dept., 742 F.2d 586 (11th Cir.
1984); see also Joshi v. Florida St. Univ. Health Ctr., 763 F.2d 1227, 1235-36 (11th Cir. 1985)
(presence or absence of direct evidence irrelevant where court deemed employer's rebuttal
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the court so holds. 210 These decisions are wholly inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's repeated reminders that the trial court's factual conclusions, includ-
ing those regarding the ultimate question of discrimination, cannot be
overturned unless they are clearly erroneous. 2'";
The most direct criticism of the Bell test has come, however, from two
district courts. In Spanier v. Morrison's Management Services,2 2 an age
discrimination case, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Alabama reviewed the hopelessly conflicting state of Fifth/Eleventh
Circuit precedent in a number of areas. 2 3 After a jury verdict for the
plaintiff, the defendants moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
arguing that a charge based on the Bell test was wholly at odds with
Burdine.21 4 The Spanier court stated that it agreed with the defendants, but
felt bound by Eleventh Circuit precedent to the contrary.
21s
The district court in Spanier went on to explain that:
In Lee v. Russell County Board of Education ... and its
progeny, the Eleventh Circuit has held that a trial court's finding
that a statement evidencing a bias was made, is tantamount to
"proof" that bias was a substantial motivating factor in the making
of a particular employment decisions. In Bell ... the court appar-
ently concluded that if the evidence consists of direct testimony that
the defendant made a sexually biased statement, and the trier of the
fact accepts the testimony, the ultimate issue of discrimination is
proved. . . . Apparently credible evidence of a sexual bias is-tanta-
"insufficient as a matter of law"); Nash v. Consol. City of Jacksonville, 763 F.2d 1393 (11th
Cir. 1985) (firefighter promotion examination should have been justified by business necessity;
Griggs/Teal test, not Burdine, applies and Aikens is irrelevant); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897, 912-13 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (although credibility resolutions by a trial court are normally
conclusive, credibility assessments premised on "a faulty theory" are not); cf. Nix v. WLCY
Radio/Rehall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181 (l1th Cir. 1984) (reversing because pretext
finding was allowed to obscure failure to make out a prima facie case).
210. Cf. Allison v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 680 F.2d 1318, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 1982)
(employer's decision may properly be based on subjective factors); Fowler v. Blue Bell, Inc.,
737 F.2d 1007 (l1th Cir. 1984); Conner v. Fort Gordon Bus Co., 761 F.2d 1495 (l1th Cir.
1985); Phillips v. Joint Legislative Committee, 637 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 960 (1982).
211. Pullman Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982) (reversing Eleventh Circuit's rejection
of judgment for defendant); Anderson v. Bessemer City, 105 S.Ct. 1504 (1985) (reversing Fourth
Circuit's rejection of judgment for plaintiff); Lehman v. Trout, 465 U.S. 1056 (1984); see also
Note, The Standard of Appellate Review in Title VII Disparate-Treatment Actions, 50 U. Cm.
L. REV. 1481 (1983). The Eleventh Circuit's view on this subject is expressed in Maddox v.
Claytor, 764 F.2d 1539, 1545 (11th Cir. 1985).
212. 611 F. Supp. 642 (N.D. Ala. 1985).
213. Included in the discussion were inconsistent tests for granting a directed verdict,
confusion over the weight to be given to employee evaluations, and the "meaningless" liquidated





mount to proof of "acting" with a discriminatory motive and the
element of causation is eliminated. Apparently, the appellate court
makes the leap from a discriminatory statement being made to
proving an illegal motive was "a significant or substantial factor in
an employment decision." This court has always assumed that direct
evidence or bias can be weighed in determining whether a plaintiff
has met his or her burden of proving either a prima facie case or
pretext.
216
The Spanier court continued, noting that, "In a Title VII disparate
treatment suit, the plaintiff always retains the burden of proving discrimi-
nation by the employer." 21 7 The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama in Spanier perceived a fundamental error in shifting the
burden of proof to the defendant in Title VII disparate treatment suits, and
merging the constitutional framework of a Mt. Healthy analysis with the
analytic scheme of McDonnell-Douglas. The District Court in Spanier ex-
plained this concern as a:
General criticism ... that the attempt to synthesize the standards
enunciated in Mt. Healthy with Title VII standards enunciated in
McDonnell-Douglas v. Green and its progeny is incongruous. It
appears to be totally illogical to suggest that a court can find that
the plaintiff was the victim of intentional discrimination which
connotes a causal finding and, at the same time, find that the
defendant would have taken the same action in the absence of
discrimination. The approach appears to be an illogical way to shift
the burden of persuasion, presumably definitively allocated in Bur-
dine.... What appears to be eliminated is the causal factor in
connection with direct evidence as it relates to the plaintiff's burden
of persuasion. The Eleventh Circuit appears to make the leap, in
Title VII cases, that all credible "direct evidence" of discrimination
is proof of a substantial motivating factor.
The difficulty created by the Mt. Healthy approach is made
vivid by this case. On the one hand, the jury is instructed that the
burden of persuasion or proof is on the plaintiff. On the other hand,
they are instructed that, when there is direct evidence, the burden
shifts to the defendant. Thus direct evidence is given inordinate
weight and the jury cannot help but be confused. 28 These gratuitous
216. Id. at 643.
217. Dickerson v. Metropolitan Dade County, 659 F.2d 574, 580 (5th Cir. 1981) (emphasis
supplied in Spanier).
218. "This court has repeatedly charged juries that the law makes no distinction between
the weight to be given direct and circumstantial evidence." Spanier v. Morrison's Management
Services, 611 F.Supp. 642, 145 n.4 (N.D. Ala. 1982). See Eleventh Circuit Pattern Criminal
Charge 4.2; see also Fifth Circuit Pattern Criminal Charge 5.
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and somewhat churlish comments are offered for whatever question-
able value they may have.
The fact that there was present, in this case, "direct evidence"
of discrimination which shifted the burden of persuasion to defend-
ants coupled with proof of a prima facie case would appear to
require this court to deny defendants' motion.2 9 Plaintiff appears
to have satisfied all four prongs of a prima facie case. 220
It is no wonder that the District Court in Spanier found the Eleventh
Circuit's treatment of the burden of Proof in employment discrimination
cases perplexing. The Eleventh Circuit's analytical models seem to be little
more than a phased regression to the pre-Burdine, pre-Teamsters, pre-
Rodriquez days when the Fifth Circuit was fulfilling its desire "to make sure
the Act works.
21
Spanier must be contrasted with another district court decision in the
Eleventh Circuit which illustrates the lengths to which the Bell test can be
taken. Maddox v. Grandview Care Center, Inc., 222 a pregnancy discrimination
action, involved an employment leave policy which stated, "Maternity leave
is limited to three months per employee" while the provisions for absence
for "illness" contained no time limitation. 223 The United States District
Court for the Middle District of Georgia concluded in Maddox that the
policy was "discriminatory on its face," thereby constituting "direct evidence
of discriminatory intent. ' 224 Citing Thurston andRussell County,. the court
brushed aside the employer's assertions that extended maternity leave was
available since no instances were named in which "a single employee ...
had obtained such an extended maternity leave under the policy in effect. 225
The defendant's attempts to adduce evidence that the same decision would
have been reached irrespective of plaintiff's pregnancy were likewise re-
jected. 2
26
The other case which is highly critical of the Bell test is the decision of
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Electrolux Corp.227 The court,
being situated in the Fourth Circuit, was free to decline to follow the
219. "There is a real question as to whether the 'direct evidence' of discrimination in this
case was strong evidence." 611 F. Supp. at 645.
220. Id.
221. See Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970); see also
Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp.,.498 F.2d 641, 658-59 (5th Cir. 1974). But see Culpepper v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 895 (5th Cir. 1970) (Coleman, J., concurring) ("it is never
the duty or concern of the courts 'to make sure the Act works."').
222. 607 F. Supp. 1404 (M.D. Ga. 1985).
223. Id. at
224. Id. at
225. Id. at 1405-06.
226. Id. at 1406-07.
227. 611 F.Supp. 926 (E.D. Va. 1985).
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Eleventh Circuit's lead. Judge Warriner of the Eastern District of Virginia
met the burden of proof issue head-on; stating that, "it is not the nature of
the evidence offered in proof of the case but the nature of the method of
proof offered that is sought to be be captured, inartfully and confusingly I
believe, by the terms circumstantial evidence and direct evidence.. .."s221
Thus, said the court, Thurston2-9 Perryman,2 0 and Bell3 "are dealing with
evidence, direct or circumstantial, which has proven discrimination without
the need to rely on the judicially created McDonnell-Douglas inference." 23 2
While observing that the Eleventh Circuit had treated "direct evidence"
as shifting the burden of proof,233 the Electrolux court stated, "Even under
plaintiff's interpretation ... the burden of proof did not shift to defendant
to prove that it would have fired plaintiff even absent its discriminatory
conduct until plaintiff has proven discrimination by the Thurston proof
method. ' 23 4 No such proof having been credited by the court, no prima facie
case was made.
The court concluded:
The foregoing discussion on the burden of proof was prompted
by the vexingly careless use of words by judges in deciding discrim-
ination actions. Ordinarily, I would not deal at such length with
such well-known evidentiary criteria for deciding cases. However,
the EEOC, the pre-eminent authority on illegal discrimination, in
oral argument and in brief contended earnestly for its mistaken view.
Under the circumstances I thought it appropriate carefully to con-
sider the Commission's argument. 2 -5
F. What Is an Employer to Do?
The approach adopted by the Eighth Circuit's decision in DeHues v.
Western Electric Company2 6 suggests a logical compromise. Holding that
the presence of some direct evidence of discriminatory intent does not
preclude use of the McDonnell Douglas format, the Deltues court stated
"where either party disputes one or more elements of the McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case and insists that proof of each element "is essential to the
case, the trial court should be cautious in departing from the McDonnell
Douglas framework. ' 2 7 By contrast, an otherwise divided Third Circuit
228. EEOC v. Electrolux Corp., 611 F. Supp. 926, 927-28 (E.D. Va. 1985).
229. Trans World Airlines Inc. v. Thurston, 105 S.Ct. 613 (1985).
230. Perryman v. Johnson Products Co., 580 F. Supp. 1015 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
231. Bell v. Birmingham Linen Service, 715 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104
S.Ct. 2385 (1984).
232. EEOC v. Electrolux Corp., 611 F. Supp. 926, 929(E.D. Va. 1985).
233. Id. at 931 n.5.
234. Id. at 931 (emphasis in original).
235. Id. at 933.
236. 710 F.2d 1344 (8th Cir. 1983).
237. Id. at 1346-47.
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panel in Massarsky v. General Motors Corporation238 found itself in agree-
ment over the need for a separate showing of intent to discriminate once it
could be seen that "an employer's policy or practice is discriminatory on its
face. ' 23 9 The panel majority deemed such proof unnecessary2 40 and Judge
Sloviter's dissenting opinion agrees:
In cases of facially discriminatory policy, the policy itself establishes
the intent necessary to show discriminatory intent .... There is no
evidence in [McDonnell Douglas] or its progeny that it establishes
the exclusive method of proving discriminatory treatment. Direct
evidence of discrimination obviously would suffice. Similarly, a
facially discriminatory policy satisfies the requisite proof.2 4°1
With all due respect, such an assertion will not withstand scrutiny.
"Discrimination" does not prove "intent to discriminate" any more than
the fact that a crime has been committed establishes mens rea.242 Unrebutted
direct evidence which relates directly to the motives and state of mind of the
decision maker with respect to a particular challenged decision may, if
credited, supply proof of discriminatory intent. Such evidence is, however,
most likely to be used to establish that the employer's explanation is
pretextual. It is the truly rare case in which the employer's sole articulated
reason is a policy or practice which would be discriminatory in the absence
of a statutory defense; statutory affirmative defenses, consisting as they do
of exceptions to the protections afforded by the law, are narrowly, construed
and must be proved by the defendant who relies upon them.
24-
Admittedly, the courts have been cast adrift by the Supreme Court's use
of murky language and apparently inconsistent rationales; evidence of the
chaos so created is easily seen in recent appellate decisions. 24 Some judges
238. 706 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 348 (1984).
239. Id. at 119.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 127, 128.
242. See Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Law: Statistical
Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HARV. L. REV. 387, 393 (1975) ("Courts are willing to proceed as
though discrimination explains the observed conditions even in the absence of direct evidence.")
see also Dillon v. Coles, 746 F.2d 998, 1004 (3d Cir. 1984) ("Just as in the tort field, where
'negligence in the air' is not enough to fasten liability on a defendant, so in a Title VII case
discrimination in general does not entitle an individual to specific relief.").
243. See, e.g., Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 105 S.Ct. 2743, (1985) (age not accepted as
bona fide occupational qualification); Johnson v. City of Baltimore, 105 S.Ct. 2717 (1985) (same).
Professor Belton argues that all employers' defenses are necessarily affirmative, a view which
finds some support in the ADEA (exclusions for "discharge or discipline for cause" (29 U.S.C.
§623(f)(3)) and for "differentiation based on reasonable factors other than age" (29 U.S.C. §
623(0(1)). See Belton, supra note 56. No court has accepted this view, however.
244. See, e.g., Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
105 S.Ct. 266 (1984) ("but for" standard applies to all employment discrimination cases) (noted




have gone so far as to contend that the actual effect of the Burdine analysis
is to require direct evidence of intent in every case.2 45 This is not so, as the
Supreme Court has pointed out. In United States Postal Service Board of
Governors v. Aikens,246 the United States Supreme Court stated:
[W]hen the defendant fails to persuade the district court to dismiss
the action for lack of a prima facie case, and responds to the
plaintiff's proof by offering evidence of the reason for the plaintiff's
rejection, the factfinder must then decide whether the rejection was
discriminatory within the meaning of Title VII. At this state, the
McDonnell-Burdine presumption "drops from the case," and "the
factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity"....
The "factual inquiry" in a Title VII case is "whether the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff." . . . In short, the
district court must decide which party's explanation of the employer's
motivation it believes.
24 7
Aikens emphasizes that direct evidence of discriminatory intent is not re-
quired in order to establish a prima facie case.2 48 The evidence which was
not characterized as "direct" is significant:
Aikens showed that white persons were consistently promoted
and detailed over him and all other black persons between 1966 and
1974. Aikens has been rated as "an outstanding supervisor whose
management abilities are far above average." There was no derog-
atory or negative information in his Personnel Folder. He had more
supervisory seniority and training and development courses than all
but one of the white persons who were promoted above him. He
had a Masters Degree and has completed three years of residence
towards a Ph.D. Aikens had substantially more education than the
white employees who were advanced ahead of him; of the 12, only
two had any education beyond high school and none had a college
degree. He introduced testimony that the person responsible for the
promotion decisions at issue had made numerous derogatory com-
ments about blacks in general and Aikens in particular. If the District
Court were to find, on the basis of this evidence, that the Postal
245. See Wells v. Gotfredson Motor Co., 709 F.2d 493, 499 (8th Cir. 1983) (Lay, J.,
dissenting).
246. 461 U.S. 941, (1983); see also Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S.
867, (1984).
247. United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 461 U.S. 941 (1983) (quoting
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981)).
248. Id. ("we agree... that the District Court should not have required Aikens to submit
direct evidence of discriminatory intent.")
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Service did discriminate against Aikens, we do not believe that this
would be reversible error.
249
It should be apparent from the foregoing discussion that direct evidence,
just as any other form of evidence, may be used both to prove a prima facie
case and to show that an employer's articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons are, in reality, pretextual. A policy or practice which is specifically
based on age, sex, or race does not even fit within the individual disparate
treatment model, since such a policy or practice has a classwide effect which
presumably has disparate impact. But no authority can be found which
supports a burden-shifting requirement simply because there has been credible
testimony that a decision-maker harbors a bias. If that bias is a determinative
factor in the decision which is at issue 2 5 0-"in the sense that, 'but for' his
employer's motive to discriminate against him ... he would not have been
adversely treated" 2 '-the plaintiff should prevail. 2-2 Consequently, the Su-
249. Id. n.2.
250. The "direct evidence" test, as applied by the Eleventh Circuit, assumes that there is
only one motive for an employer's actions. This is not usually the case. As the Tenth Circuit
has explained in discussing instructions to an age discrimination jury, "The jury must understand
that it is not enough that age discrimination figures in the decision to demote or discharge; age
must 'make a difference' between termination and retention of the employee in the sense that,
'but for' the factor of age discrimination, the employee would not have been adversely affected."
Perrell v. Financeamerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654, 656 (10th Cir. 1984), quoted with approval in
EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1170 (10th Cir.), vacated, U.S.-
(1985). Just as the plaintiff need not prove that discrimination was the sole motivating factor,
the defendant does not lose simply because some discriminatory motive may have been present.
See generally Lansman, Dual Motive Terminations: The Shifting Burdens, 10 EMPLOYEE REL.
L.J. 64 (1984); Furnish, Formalistic Solutions to Complex Problems: The Supreme Court's
Analysis of Individual Disparate Treatment Cases Under Title VII, 6 INDUS. REL. L. J. 353
(1984); Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social
Policy Prospective, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 292 (1982); cf. Remar, Climbing Mt. Healthy: In Search
of the "Wright Line" on Mixed-Motive Discharges Under Section 8(a)(3), 4 INDUS. REL. L. J.
636 (1981); DuRoss, Toward Rationality in Discriminatory Discharge Cases: The Impact of Mt.
Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle Upon the NLRA, 66 GEo. L. J. 1109 (1978).
251. See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1019 (1st Cir. 1979) (citing McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 283 n.10 (1976)); Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663 (1st
Cir. (1979); Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979); Mt. Healthy City
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Rosaly v. Ignacio, 593 F.2d 145 (1st Cir. 1979);
National Labor Relations Board v. Eastern Smelting & Refining Corp., 598 F.2d 666 (1st Cir.
1979).
252. The Eleventh Circuit has a variety of approaches to the "but for" test. For example,
in Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (lth Cir. 1982), an exhaustive analysis of the
burden of proof in sexual harassment actions brought under Title VII, the court applied the
McDonnell-Douglas model of proof to claims of "hostile or offensive work environment" but
stated that "quid pro quo" harassment claims would be analyzed from a strict liability standpoint
even though McDonnell-Douglas was cited. Id. at 908-12 and n.22. However, the court rejected
an argument that the burden of proof shifted to the employer criticizing the D.C. Circuit's
approach in Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1981), as imposing "an onerous
burden of persuasion to rebut the prima facie case" which was deemed inconsistent with
Burdine. As part of the plaintiff's prima facie case of an "environmental" sexual harassment
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preme Court's statement in Thurston25" is capable of a reading which places
it in the mainstream of burden of proof analyses, but the Eleventh Circuit's
pronouncements in Bell and its offspring are misstatements of the law and
should be corrected.
case, "the plaintiff must show that but for the fact of her sex, she would not have been the
object of harassment." Id. at 904. It was implied that the same requirement applies to the quid
pro quo case. Id. at 909, 911 n.22).
For other decisions which refer to the "but for" test as a plaintiff's burden, see, e.g.,
Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 10903, 1019 (Ist Cir. 1979); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027
(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981); Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 923-25 (3d
Cir. 1977); Smith v. University of North Carolina, 632 F.2d 316, 333 (4th Cir. 1980); Tice v.
Lampert Yards, Inc., 761 F.2d 1210, 1217 (7th Cir. 1985); Bibbs v. Block, 749 F.2d 508 (8th
Cir. 1984), reh'g en banc pending, Lincoln v. Board of Regents, 697 F.2d 928, 938 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, U.S. ; McGee v. South Pemiscot Sch. Dist., 712 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1983); Matthews
v. Allis-Chalmers, 38 FEP Case. 1118 (7th Cir. 1985). In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp.
Co., under facts which the Court deemed "indistinguishable from McDonnell Douglas, " a Fifth
Circuit decision (513 F.2d 90 (1975)) was reversed; the Court said that plaintiff bore the "but
for" burden, citing Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)-which is not
pertinent to that point.
253. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing Thurston).
19861

